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Article 6

Book Reviews
Tb. Language of Mudc by Deryck Cooke. London: Oxford Universiry Press,
1959. Pp. xiv + 289. 30 s. net.
A review of this book has a place in a journal not devoted to technical subjects
because though the demonstration of the thesis is quite technical, the thesis itself
is not. The basic assurnpcion of the authar is commonly held and might be
described thus: When a composer of musie creates musical forms, he is under
the sway of emotions which determine the configurations he produces and which
those configurations in turn arause in properly disposed hearers. Mr. Deryck
Cooke defines musicality as a "sympathetic emotional reSponse to a work" (p.
205). Thus he champions a basic theory which is denied by present day puristcontructivists but which most musical amateurs und devotees accept as self-evident.
Though he, might admit that musicaliry is the ability to grasp tonal wholes
organized under the governance of rhythm and tempo in terms of pitch-elements
occurring simultaneously or in succession, he would say that this definition does
not go far enough: it omits the emotional cause-and-effect of the contemplated
whole. What Cooke of course is attempting is a closing of the theoretical split
between content and form which is a phenomenon not only in contemporary
aesthetics, but also in contemporary literary, music, and art criticism. He seerns
therefore to be combatting the "purism " usually attributed to Eduard Hanslick
(though Hanslick denied, not the emotional powers of music, but its ability to
imitate or delineate) and found also, as Cooke shows, in Stravinsky and Hindemith.
That music is an expressive medium they take pains to denYj that it can be nothing
else Cooke attempts to show by referring to the specific effects. of what he calls
musical "terms," though these effects cannot be labelled linguistically except in
vague and approximative ways. Musical form, he thinks, is the means of achieving
"the dispositions of various terms of emotional expression in a significant order"
(p. 212). 'For Cooke it is therefore a means to an end, not an end in itself.
Like everyone who accepts bis basic principle, Cooke is in august company.
The assumption of Plato and Aristotle that music (and indeed the very scales of
which it is composed) in arousing emotions can produce certain educative and
ethical effects is weIl known to scholars. There is wide acceptance among
educated readers of the rather loose doctrines found in J. W. N. Sullivan's book
on Beethoven (1927), in which music is treated as an expression of valuable
spiritual states, and also (though here the reasons may be extra-musical ones) in
Albert Schweitzer's book on Bach (1905), in which heavy emphasis is placed on
a literary kind of symbolism. Susanne K. Langer in Philoropby in a N ew Key
(1942) has interpreted music as emotion expressed morphologically and as an
unconsummated symbol. The laboratory psychologists with varying degrees of
unsuccess have investigated the emotional power of music and its specific emotional referents. Mr. Cooke belongs to the tradition, not of literary, philosophical,
or aesthetic speculatioD, however, but to a technical one found in the baroque
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period in European art: I am referring to the AfJektenlehre (theory of aff'ects),
which was an attempt to codify the relation between musical "figures" and the
emotions. "Affections" were thought of as stereotyped iuta an extensive numher
of musical figures. The basis of this endeavor was the supposed parallel between
music and speech (rhetoric). Cooke's position is elose also to that of J. P. Rameau,
who in bis Traite de l'harmonie (1722) held that harmony can arause different
passions depending on the tonal combinations which are employed. Among the
passions he included sadness, languor, tendemess, agreeability, gaiety, despair,
anger, and others. In a similar fashion, Cooke attempts not only to define melody,
harmony, rhythm, and tempo, but also to show how they work emotionally.
Referring always to the tonal system of the western world, he quotes voluminously from composers from 1400 to the present day. Like Wilson Knight, whom
he mentions as elucidating the U content" of literary worles through an interpretation of the psychological and emotional connotations of the images analyzed
(p. xü), he tries to identify idioms and arrange a list of meanings. Though his
book is called The Language of Music (and thus he has tentative connections with
the tradition of Hegei), he admits that music has no conceptual capacities. He
resorts to an essentially gestaltist view that a11 aspects of the emotional complex
which melody, harmony, rhythm, and tempo produce are in a relation of mutual
interdependence to one another. Thus he argues for the indivisibility of form
(the music) and content (the emotion), bis ideal being to show that formal and
emotional impacts are the same thing (p. 32). His attempt at demonstrating this
indivisibility through analyses of Mozarr's fortieth and Vaughan Williams' sixth
symphonies is frustrated chiefly by the magnitude of his task, which is impossible
of realization in less than several comprehensive volumes. What confronts him
is ehe problem of any gestaltist who attempts to grasp wholes by means of the
analytical method.
When Cooke grapples with the matter of music as a language of ehe emotions,
one is reminded of Yeats' assertion in his essay" The Symbolism of Poerry" that
a11 sounds "either because of their pre-ordained energies or because of long assoeiation, evoke indefinable and yet precise emotions..••" Cooke would agree (as
did Mendelssohn when he said that the thoughts expressed to him by music were
too definite, not too indefinite, to be put into words) that music is therefore a
more precise feeling-Ianguage than is language itself when it names feelings. For
him a language-theory is not far distant from an emotion-theory: music is a
language of the emotions. Yet when he tries to equate patterns with emotions,
Cooke unwittingly ehrough the use of quotation marks shows his distrust of his
own linguistic labels: "yeaming," "defeatist," "hopeful," U lively," and so forth.
But the fact is ehat there are not enough linguistic labels for human emotions,
which must be named in terms of ranges and classes; and there is even a more
fundamental question of what constittltes an emotion: 15 Uresignation" one, for
instance?
The wealmess of this book is in its aestherlc and psychological supports, therefore. Cooke is right to insist that music is an expressive medium, to interpret
musical symbolism in terms of we11-known forms of the conventional tonal system,
and to adopt an empirical approach to bis subjecr. He occasionally runs into
trouble because of ehe metaphorical character of all attempts to describe music.
(The trouble he has with his own style is of course his own.) And he allows
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himself to be carried away in his enthusiasm for his subject: He thioks musie is
"the most articulate language of the unconscious ..." (p. x), and his use of the
ward" must" betrays his own uncertainty. A certain complex of emotions, he
says, must have been seeking an oudet as the composer writes: of this the composer may be aware, OI ooly somewhat aware, OI completely unaware (p. 169).
As triclcy a cancept as the unconscious is inspiration; but again the ward must
QCcurs: Inspiration must be "an unconscious creative re-shaping of already
existing materials in the tradition" (p. 171; italics delcted).
But his ground is even more inseCllre when he teIls us what Beethoven must
have felt when he WIore the Eroica and how the necessities of his eomposing
must have erystallized (p. 17). At the same time, even this is quitc different
from saying that the tentative fugato which Sclmbert wrote for the second
subject of his Nintb felt wrong to hirn (p. 218), Two different orders of emotion
are involved, the first being that of the emotion expressed in the musie and the
second being that of a satisfaetion or dissatisfaction with the tonal strueture in its
tonal context. Here Coolee eonfuses the emotions involved, their sources, and
their relevancies-not, by the way, an unusual failing in music criticism, or
aesthetics eicher. Can one really say that Beethoven felt "joy" when he wrote
the Ninth (p. 218)? Coolee clearly does not give enough credit to the objectivizing
imagination of the composer, who, as symphonist or writer of operas, often
resembles merely a teehnician, and often a dramatist.
In any ease, Coolee's ehief subjeet is not aesthetics, but, as I luve suggested, a
leind of musical-emotive rhetorie. He worles out the details of that rhetoric by
discussing musical "terms" and their emotive effects. What is a term? One
example is aseries of tones which as part of the eonventional system of tonal
organization of the western world produces a well-defined though only an approximately deseribable impression. Take the first live tones of the major seale
played in suceession, for instanee. The emotion here expressed is outgoing, assertive, affirmative (pp. 115-119). The first five notes of the minor scale, on thc
other hand, when they are played in succession assert "sorrow, a complaint, a
protest against misfonune" (p. 122). If one eonsiders the number of possibilities
if successive tones are treated as units or "terms," the number of units to be
charaeterized is appalling; and if one were to add to these "terms" made up of
tones in sucecssion those made of tones oceurring simultaneously (intervals and
chords) and then add also the infinite possibilities of rhythm, timbre, and tempo,
one grasps in a nutshell the difficulties of a total analysis of musical expression.
But to this total analysis Coolee malees an outstanding contribution, and one
might almost caH hirn a pioneer for these days.
Yet I should like to mention two errors-as it seems to me-which illusrrate the
pitfalls of the rhetorieal-emotive analysis of musie. There can be mistakes in
observation whieh call for revision-always a possibility in empirieal-scientific
investigations. One such mistake occurs in eonnection with Cooke's observation
that the augmented fourth and the diminished fifth are the same note (pp. 84
and 88). They are not: "spelling" has nothing to do with the matter; but the
very kind of effect Coolee is analyzing does. Anyone who plays e and f sharp
simultaneously on the piano and then touches a d in thc base bears an augmented
fourth; if he touches an a Rat instead of the d, he hears a diminished fifth. The
augmented fourth "suives" upwards; thc diminished fifth "pulls" downwards.

390

BOOK REVIEWS

These are elementary facts of the western harmonie system, and Cooke's description of the augmented fourth as expressing "devilish and inimical farces" (p. 90)
cannat apply to the diminished fifth at all. Another mistake-or at least difficultyin observation involves the identification of keys. The complexities of harmonieexpressive analysis come to the fore when Cooke speaks abaut thc famaus opening
phrase of Tristan and Isolde (pp. 190 ff.). He quite confidently thinks of it as
opening in cl minor (a "tragic" minar sixth and "anguish" are involved) j but
it is not irrelevant to indicate that othcr people are just as confident that the key
is a minar Of even f major. Each interpretation is defensible and each has a
delightfullogic of its own. If the phrase is in d minor, it probably is a "passionate
outburst of painful emotion, which does not protest further, but falls back into
acceptance" (pp. 137-138); if ie is in a minor, it probably expresses" Semitonal
tension downward ... : active anguish in a context of flux"j if ie is in f major,
the rise from the sixth of thc scale to the tonic (though unexplained by Cooke)
must be "optimistic," while the descent from the tonic to the seventh is possibly
expressive of "an incoming emotion of joy" (p. 159). Though this last description
is mere conjeccurc, je is not impossible to suppose that the difficulty of such
analysis as this suggests that the " expression" of the phrase is multiple and contradictory: optimism and joy are possibly in a sharp uncomfortable blend with pain
accepted as apart of life's flux, an of these intense emotions being modified and
mitigaeed in the fashion which is characteristic of art. When one first hears the
phrase, one cannoe possibly Imow what the key is, however, and under the
pressure of the tonal ambiguity his ears are forced to search avidly for apreeise
tonal location. (I am speaking of ehe beginning of the phrase, not of the end.)
While I am sure that Cooke is in error here or that at least he simplifies his case,
I am more interested in agreeing with his own contention that his kind of investigation demands much supplementation.
Mr. Cooke has done a service to both theorizers and practical musicians: because
of his efforts the former are a little doser to the realization of their dream that
musical expression can be explained, though the end is still far from sightj and
the latter can apply to his book for suggestions about performance. At the same
time, his forthrightness and franlmess luve enabled Cooke not to claim too muchexcept in the realm of aesthetic theory-and he has been able to recognize many
ambiguities (for instance that of the minor "system," pp. 90 ff.) which plague the
researcher in his field. At the same time he has been courageous enough to make
observations similar to those of WölfHin, who distinguishcs between the linear
and the painterly for the field of the visual arts. I mean his attribution of technical
preferences to certain historical periods: the major triad, he says, is a secular,
pleasure-revealing principle which the medieval church tried to suppress, and
its replacement since 1850 by chromaticism reveals a growing doubt about the
possibility or even the desirability of personal happiness (p. 109). If one can
accept his basic premises, then Cooke's tentative sociological and philosophical
explanations of technical practices take on a certain cultural relevancy. Faulty as
Cooke's book may be as aesthetics and as a psychology of creativity, it contains
speculations and suggestions which point not only to the vastness of the problems
which must bc examincd but also to the directions in which such examinations
must go.
HERBERT 1\1. SCHUELLER

Wayne State University
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Sir ]oslJua Reynolds: Discourses on Art, ed. by Robert R. Wark. San Marino:
The Huntington Library, 1951. Plates. Pp. xxxv + 321. $10.
During the course of the eighteenth century, a gaod many Englishmen wrote
abaut the art of painting, but only the fifteen discourses that Sir Joshua Reynolds,
President of the Royal Academy, delivered periodically between 1769 and 1790 are
widely lrnown taday. They havc often been reprintcd and have therefore always
been available to students of the period, who have found in them a supcrb statement of those critical principles which we eall "classical" OI "neo-c1assical" OI
"acadernie," Although addressed to students of thc plastic arts, the Discourses
are also valuable to students of literary theary, for, since the Renaissance, the
notion that painting and poetry are "sisters" had assured a dose and parallel
development in the theories of both those arts.
Reynolds spoke to his fellow Academicians and their pupils not only as a
successful and brilliant practitioner of his own art, but also as a life-long student
of European painting, its theory and its history. Indeed, he is a late instance of
the Renaissance ideal of the learned painter-Iearned in other arts, in the techniques
of his craft, and in the theory of art which had been developed in the Renaissance
largely out of the antique and the sixteenth-century Roman school of painting,
of which Raphael and Michelangelo were the most influential representatives.
The Discourses were listened to with respect and rightly so, for they reveal the
humanistic and liberal mind of a man free of pedantry and deeply concerned
for the good estate of painting in Britain.
We have long needed a critical edition of the Discourses. This need has at last
been met by Robert R. Warlc, who is Curator of Art Collections at the Huntington Library and Art Gallery, and who has edited this volumc, which will certainly
remain the standard edition for a very long time. The annotated and illustrated
edition published by Roger Fry in 1905 is out of print and was long since outmoded. During the last twenty-five years, a good deal of important scholarshipnotably by Frederick W. Hilles, Reusselaer W. Lee, Walter Jackson Bate, Ellis
Waterhouse, and Walter J. Hipple-has been devoted to Reynolds, to his own
theories, aud to the critical tradition from which those theories derive. Wark
has relied on this more recent worlc, both in his informative explanatory notes and
in his introductory essay.
Wark provides us, moreover, ,vith the first critically edited text of the Discom·ses. He has, properly, based his own text on that of Edmond Malone's edition
of Reynolds' Works, 1797, ,vhich contains the painter's "last corrections and
additions"; and a careful collation of this text with earlier ones has produced
textual notes that record a11 of Reynolds' revisions, excisions, and additions.
Twenty-eight plates in black and white Cselected, it seems to me, more judiciously
than were many of Fry's thirty-three plates) are offered as illustrations of various
ideas expressed in the Discourses and add to the splendor as weil as the usefulness
of this admirably made book. There are also three useful bibliographies: a list of
early and important later editions of Reynolds' writings; a list of books that
Reynolds read or might have read while preparing the Discourses; and a select list
of important critical and historical studies of Reynolds and of the critical traditions for which he spoke. Clearly this is the edition to which serious students
must go in the future.
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In his introduction Mr. Wark examines briefly some of Reynolds' principal ,11
topics, all farniliar in sixteenth- and seventeenth-cenmry treatises on painting: the ,'!
role of ideal beauty or of the general as opposed to the minutely particular in ,: I
great and serious art; the hierarchy of the genres, from history painting down to
still life; the necessity of discipline and of a lmowledge of the great masters of
the past in the training of a painter, and the idea that such discipline eventually
frees the mature painter from rigorous obedience to the mIes; the moral end of
art, etc. These ideas were commonplaces in the humanistic theory of painting
and were the common property of artis!s and connaisseurs from the sixteenth
century onward. They were grounded in the antique and in the practice of such
painters as RaphaeI, Michelangelo, the Caracci, and Nicholas Poussin, and they
reached their ultimate formulation in the doctrine of the Academie Royale toward
the end of the seventeenth century.
Mr. Wark is aware of a more modern, a British element in Reynolds' thought,
but it seems to me that he inadvertendy misinterprets its significance. Reynolds
taught not only what he considered the enduring wisdom of the ancients and the
Roman and Venetian masters of the High Renaissance, but also certain ideas that
had been developed during the eighteenth cenrury by British empirical aesthe~
ticians. It is this empirical bent of Reynolds' mind that infuriated William Blake
and provoked many of the well-known marginal comments in Ws copy of the
Works of Reynolds. And it is because of the presence of these modem notions
that the Discourses differ from most earBer writings on painting, for instance,
from Charles Du Fresnoy's De Arte Grapbica, a characteristic treatise of the
seventeenth cenrury, which Dryden had translated in 1695 and which Reynolds
hirnself annotated for William Mason's translation, published in 1783.
Mr. Wark isolates three of these ideas: the notion that the association of ideas
plays an important role in aesthetic response; the importance of CI imagination"
both to the painter and to the viewer of his workj and the conviction that the
disciplined genius attains finally the freedom to paint as an individual, not as an
imitator or as a slave to rules. Regarding Reynolds as a CI rationalist" (was he, in
fact?) Mr. Wark associates these principles with CI romanticism," and is thus led
to find in the Discourses a carefully maintained compromise between CI reason "
and CI imagination and feeling," between the CI dassic" and the CI romantic." But
it is plain from the introduction that Mr. Wark is aware that these ideas were
constants in earlier eighteenth-cenrury critical theory: they would not have dis~
turbed Dryden or Pope or Johnson, and they had been expressed over and again
by scores of writers. The CI compromise" that Mr. Wark observes in the Discourses was as basic to eighteenth-century aesthetic theory as the idea of the social
contract was to eighteenth-century political theory. Reynolds, as Mr. Wark
points out, was aware of imporrant changes that were taking place in European
painring during the last half of the century, and in his own painring he showed
himself sympathetic to contemporary art. But it is not dear that his insistence
on associationism or his conviction that art must strike the imagination or that
mIes are of secondary importance to the mattlre artist indicate an element of
CI romanticism" in the Discourses.
Mr. Wark is on firmer ground when he denies that the later Discourses reveal
any considerable change in Reynolds' basic critical ideas. In the main, Reynolds
was as conservative in 1790 as he had been in 1769; as liberal in 1769 as he was
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in 1790. IVIr. Warlt argues partIy from a dose reading of the text and in part
from the nature of Reynolds' revisions, made in some cascs years after the
original version of a discourse bad been completed. He points out, for cxample,
the addition in the final version of Discourse III of two important paragraphs, in
which Reynolds re-emphasized his conviction of the imponance of "ruIes" cr
principles in creating a worle of art; and he did so by quoting and denying Bacon's
assertion that "felicity" and not rules detcrmines the success of a painter.

If he means that beauty has nothing to do with rule, he is mistaken.
There is a rule, obtained out of general nature, to contradict which is to
fall into deformity . . . . If by felicity is mcant any thing of chance or
hazard, or somcthing born with a man, and not earned, I cannot agrce
with this great philosopher. Every object ·which pleases must give us
pleasure upon some certain principlesj but as thc objects of pleasure are
almost infinite, so their principles vary without end, and evcry man finds
them out, not by felicity or successful hazard, but by care and sagacity.
There is little enough of the "romantic" in this characteristic passage, or indeed
in the whole of Discourse 111 of which it is a part. Blake found this Discourse
especially offensive. He exprcssed his distaste in a headnotc:
The following Discoursc is particularly Interesting to Block heads, as it
endeavours to prove That there is No such thing as Inspiration & that
any Man of a plain Understanding rnay by Thieving frorn Gthers become
a Mich. Angelo.
Empirical aesthetics played its role in the disintegration of neo-classical art. But
Reynolds, despite his use of rnany of its principles, remains one of the last great
neo-classicists and has DO claim to being OllC of the first romantics.
SAMUEL

H.

MONK

University of Minnesota

Tl:Je Re'/.lival of Metapbysical Poetry by Joseph E. Duncan. Minneapolis: The
University of Minnesota Press, 1959. Pp. 227. $4.50.
After any fundamental shift in the conception of poctry-after any critical
revolt-comes aperiod of consolidation in which thc implications of the revolution are worked out and the exaggeration of thc ncw emphases corrected. The
recent revival of rnctaphysical poetry, with its startling effccts upon colltcmporary
poetic practice and thc ncw perspective which it has imposed upon the literature
of the past, has now spent its initial cncrgies and has indeed met wirh sharp
reaccions. Joseph E. Duncan's very interesting work, The Revival of Metaphysical
Poetry, attempts a reasoned reassessmcnt of that revival of the metaphysicals with
which T. S. Eliot has been particularly identificd. Duncan begins with the
beginnings, but, as his subtitlc (" The History of a Style, 1800 to the Present")
indicates, hc concerns himself with the last one hundred and fifty years. Duncan
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finds the significant revival as beginning in the early part of the nineteenth
cenmry, with its apogee occurring in the second decade of the twentieth. His is
a detailed history, ably documented, filled with a great many highly interesting
and significant things. Its interest and usefulness are by Da means cancelled by
what seems to me some confusions and wrang choices of emphasis.
One feature of Duncan's work is an "ironing out" of literary history. Jagged
breaks in the landscape, sharp fault lines, and decisive chasms smooth out under
the historian's eye. What had seemed decisively revolutionary comes down to the
merely evolutionary. A similar process of smoothing and leveling shows itself
in the work of the scholars who a generation cr so aga worked aver the
beginnings of the Romantic revolt. Instead of dating the revolt from the publication of the frankly experimental Lyrical Ballads in 1798, they pushed the beginnings
of Romanticism funher and further back into the eighteenth century. More
recently still, a scholar has persuasively argued that even Wordsworth's "lyrical
ballads" differ in topic, style, and theme far less from the eurrent magazine verse·
of the time than we have been led to think.
Since literary culture always possesses much more of a continuity than our love
of simplification wants to allow, the toning down of decisive shift and reversal
has its element of truth. At any rate, this rounding of eontours is apparendy
inevitable when the historian comes to eontemplate historical processes of any kind.
This kind of smoothing is beautifully exemplified in Mr. Duncan's book. The
beginnings of the revival are found far back in the early nineteenth century.
One might, if he liked, push the beginnings back earlier still: Pope and Parnell
were sufficiently interested in Donne to rewrite some of his satires and it may
be that Pope's interest triggered the 1719 edition-there had been no edition sinee
that of 1669. But few would argue for an earlier beginning than the end of the
eighteenth eentury. Here it is Coleridge, of course, who has the most important
part; but DeQuincey, Landor, Beddoes, and Hood are all shown to have been
interested in the metaphysical poets and to have played their parts in creating a
taste for seventeenth-century metaphysical poetry. Dunean devotes a chapter to
" John Donne and Robert Browning," another chapter to "The Beginnings of the
Revival in America," in whieh the names of Emerson, Thoreau, and Emily
Dickinson are invoked, and a chapter on "The Catholie Revival and the MetaphysieaIs," where the relations of Hopkins, Francis Thompson, and Allce Meynell
to the seventeenth century poets are vigorously eanvassed. In short, Duncan
argues that Grierson's edition of Donne in 1912, far from initiating the revival of
metaphysical poetry, actually "marked the end" of what Duncan ealls "the first
stage of the metaphysical revival." And Dunean goes on to say: "SimiIarly, Eliot's
essays were not so much a new note as a sensitive formulation of ideas that had
become familiar by 1912."
This updating of the metaphysical revival is, up to a point, convincing.
Undoubtedly there existed a very real interest in Donne and the other metaphysical poets from the beginning of the nineteenth century onward and the
example of metaphysical poetry did, in one way or another, help determine the
s~ape of a good deal of nineteenth-eentury poetry. For example, it is startling to
discover that Charles Lamb could write "On an Infant Dying as Soon as Born ":
She did but ope an eye, and put
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Adeare beam forth, and strait up shut
For the lang dark: ne'er more to see

Through glasses of mortality.

el

The antecedents of this quatrain are clearly mctaphysical. Again, Thompson's
" The Bouud of Heaven " seems unmistakably reminiscent of the poetry of Dünne
in same of its paradoxes and in same of its more vigorous and complicated metaphors (though one hastens to add that the poem itself is as thoroughly " nineteenth
century" as any poem can wen be). Thc substantive question, however, is
whether the interest exhibited by the nineteenth century in the metaphysicals is
indeed the same as that which has played upan our paets of the twentieth century.
Twentieth-century poetry is markedly different from lare Victorian: the common
denominator of these poetries is surely not their specific inheritance frorn the
School of Donne-or at least not characteristically that.
Duncan's emphasis upon the nineteenth-century antccedents of the revival of
the metaphysicals calls to mind a related present-day movement which also undertakes to account for the modern metaphysicals in terms of nineteenth-century
origins. Frank Kermode's recent boole, The Romantic Image, for example, represents a very intelligent and, at points, persuasive attempt to derive not merely
Yeats, but also Pound, Eliot, and Hulme frorn the late Romantics and especially
frorn the poets of the 'Nineties. Indeed, it is possible to interpret the revival of
metaphysical poetry as the response to certain needs feIt by the later Romantic
poets. And Kermode has done so, though again I fiUSt say that I cannot concede
his argument fuU conviction. Kermode, by the way, is aware of some of Duncan's
arguments and tells us, dting an article in the Jom'nal of English Gnd Germanic
Philology, that Duncan has shown that Donne was" weIl and truly revived long
before Eliot's essays." Unfortunately, Kermode's book evidently came out to~
late for Duncan to be able to aUude to it. It would be interesting to have his
comments on some of Kermode's arguments, particularly those which tend to
assimilate the modern metaphysical strain to [in de siecle Romanticism.
In any case, it would have been helpful had Duncan been more explidt in
distinguishing between the impact of the metaphysicals on the nineteenth and on
the nventieth centuries. Here lies the crucial issue and it is not an easy one to
resolve. This general matter has caused trouble in the past. One remembers, for
example, how Eliot, many years ago, in deprecating what Coleridge made of
Donne, remarked that l< when it came to Donne and Cowley-you will find that
Wordsworth and Coleridge were led by the nose by Samuel Johnson: they were
just as eighteenth century as anybody." One remembers also that 1. A. Richards
was to disagree and to argue that Coleridgc did deeply appreciate Donne.
Richards, of course, was right in the sense that Coleridge did indeed admire
Donne and in his own poetry assimilated some of Donne's manner: see Coleridge's
late fragmentary poetry. But Eliot was right too: the revolution in poetry that
Wordsworth and Coleridge effected was not Donnean-not, surely, in the sense
that that led by Eliot may be called so. lf both Romantics and moderns have
used Donne, it is dear that they made something quite different of hirn.
In general Duncan's book is strong in its scholarship: he is thorough in canvassing nineteenth-century poetry; he has a sensitive ear for echoes of the metaphysicals; and he uses good sense in organizing and deploying the material that
he has gathered. The critical aspect of his book seems to me somewhat weaker.
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Though Dunean duly takes note of all the featured maIks of metaphysieal
poetty-wit, irony, ambiguity, the play with logie, the employment of a system
of correspondences, a sacramental view of the wodd, the note of impassioned
conversation, the use of dissonant images, and an the rest-I think it is less clear
that he has arrived at a definition of his own which unites these concepts, or
which by a process of sarting and modification gives them coherent relationship.
The objection i5 not that Duncan's first consideration should be to provide us with
a neat formularlon of metaphysical poetry. It is rather that, laclcing a clear
conception of metaphysical poetry, he is sometimes thrown off his course by
same of the vigorous reactions to the modern urevival." F or example, Dunean
is moved to state his fears that Danne would probably feel "undone" could he
see modem interpretations of his poetry. Or, he is impelled to report that
Rosamund Tuve has shown that Donne was "clearly not rebellious, mysterious,
or unique," does not answer to the notions of modern metaphysical poetry, and
indeed "worked within an accepted Renaissance tradition." Or again, Duncm is
constrained to tell us that he thinks it unlikely "that the metaphysicals, as some
critics have suggested, used words and images connotatively to give 'ironic' or
, dissonant' dimension to their work for its own sake. Poets used images to adorn
or to disparage, but not to do both simultaneously." The last quotation involves
a complicated confusion. Who of the modern critics argues that the metaphysical poets did both "simultaneously" (though such a critic might say that
Donne or MaIvell frequencly developed eomplex shadings of tone)? And who
of these modem critics would describe metaphysical poetry as meant either "to
adom or to disparage "? For most of these critics have actually rejected an
ornamentalist theory of rhetoric. They would maintain that Donne does not use
his images "to adom" at all, but rather that his images function to express the
very substance of the poem. (Duncan elsewhere in his book agrees that in the
best metaphysieal poetty the metaphors are the poem.)
Indeed, the ultimate point at issue here is whether a correct view of Donne's
poetry waits upon the reconstruction of the author's intention. Such a reconstruction involves the "historicism" reprehended by Rene Wellek and Ausrin
Warren in their Theory of Literatttre. One of their examples of such historicism,
by the way, is Rosamund Tuve's attempt "to explain the origin and meaning of
metaphysical imagery by reference to the training in Ramist logic by Donne and
his contemporaries." But, as Wellek and Warren argue, we do not need to "enter
into the mind and attitudes of past periods and accept their standards, deliberately
excluding the intrusions of our own preconceptions." It is certainly possible, as
Duncan hints, that a Donne, ttansported to our time, might be surprised and even
upset by the way in which twentieth-century critics and scholars have gone about
describing the structure of his poetry. But then, if they could read later accounts
of their poetry, so in all probability would Chaucer, Shakespeare, and John Keats
be surprised.
Dunean may also have let himself be too easily browheaten by criticism of
Eliot's conception of "unified sensibility." He remarlcs that "recently it has
beeome ... fashionable to dismiss " it "as an ineomprehensible private myth of
Eliot." One must not expect Duncan to do everythlng, but it would have been
helpful had he presented his assessment of this fashionable view. Does he have in
mind F. W. Bateson's note on the "Dissociation of Sensibility "? H so, one
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remembers that Batcson hirnself eoneedes that "something likc this [dissoei:1tion
of sensibility J did happen. The relationship bctwccn thc SCIlSUüUS and thc imcllcemal elements in poetry did ehangc in or about 1650."
Dunean further remarks that Eliot has undcrstood the poCtry of thc mctaphysieaJ
poets better than thcy eould hu\"c undcrstood his thcory abom their work. Bm if
Eliot has indced undcrstood thelr poctry, thcn pcrhaps his thcorizing :1bom it,
granted that his theorizing necessarily cmploys t\yemieth-century terms, lll:1Y m:ü:e
its own sense. The point is that \Vc nced not necessarily square it up with \\"hat
we supposc to be the mctaphysicals' 0\\'11 coneeption of what thc)' werc doing.
"Ambiguity" is the term that eauses Duncan most trouble and is thc term that
is most ambiguously used in his book. Thc choice of this tcrm is un[onun:1tc,
of course, though it was William Empson, not Duncan, who fixcd it in modern
eriticism. "Richness" or Wbeclwright's "plurisignification" or cycn "tonal
depth" \vould be more accurate and lcss apt to suggest contriycd ouscurity OI
dissonanee used for ltS o\\'n sake. The quality in question oeeurs in Greck poetr)'
aS W. B. Stanford has demonstrated, though a tcrm to dcscribc it does not oceur
in Greek critieism, Aristotle, for example, trcating ambiguity as mcrely adefeet.
In the same way, the lack of diseussion of this quality in Elizabetban and Jacobcan
critieism does not mean that the thing itself docs not exist as an import:mt elemem
in metaphysical poerry.
I have dweIt in same detail on what I regard as a wealmess in this book. But
I da not mean to underrate its strengths. They are morc than eonsiderab1c.
The Revival of iWetaph)'sical Poetr)' will bc a useful book to scholars for a long
time to come. As a compcndium of relevant citation and quotations it lus cxtraordinary raoge. What is to bc found hcrc will scrve ro eorreet all kinds of
superficial views of the revival. As a kind of tcst ease of thc imerrclation of
literary history and eritical theory, it iIlustrates thcir oeccssary intcrplay and
suggests both the magnitude and the clclicaey of the task of writing fnlly eoherem
aod responsible literary history. In this book, Duncal1 has gi\'en us a most
interesting first draft of an imporram ehapter of that histor)'.
CLEANTIT BROOKS

Yale Universit)'

TVilliam Faulk17er: Fro711 Jeffersol1 10 t'~e IVorld hy Byau H. \Vaggoner.
Lcxington: Thc Uni\'crsity of Kentuc1.::y Prcss, 1959. Pp. 270. 55.00.
I should like to begin this rcyiew of Hyatt H. \Vaggoncr's stndy by C]lloting
from another book, a collection of reports made of Faulkner's appc;lranccs in
Virginia, in 1957 and 1958.· An~' scrious scrminy of his remark ;lS published therc
is bound ro rcsult in a nceessar~' camion oyer the elaborate s)'mbolic interprer;lrio!1S
his re cent \\'or1.:: often seeIllS to im'ire. Speating of thc writings of ]c:m-P;lul
Sarrrc, for eX:1mplc, he says:

.. Faulk1lcr in tl,1c UlIi-.·crsity (Chuloncsyille: The L"ni\Tr,..,in· of Yirgini:l Press,
1959), cd. fredcriek L. G\\')'nl1 :lI1d ]oscph L. Blorncr.
.
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I think that no writing will be tao successf"\!l without some conception
of God, you can call Hirn by whatever name you want.... That to me
is the difference between Camus and Sartre, the difference between Sartre
and Proust, the difference betwcen Sartre and Stendahl. That Sanre has
denied God.
This is so typical of F aulkner's manner as almost to malte it paradigmacic. God
is indispensable to moral certitude, but it is "some conception of God," by
whatever name you wish to call Hirn. He is much more interested in God's
creatures than in any elaborate design of creatioll; and the religious documents
which, among other sourees, he uses as the details of reference in his fiction are
apart of the ficcional substance. That is, the Bible helps Faullmer to define bis
people, not viee versa. The H Christ symbolism" which is so active apart of
Faullmer ericicism is very much to the point here .
• . . there are so few plots to use [Faullmer said in another session with
the Virginians] that sooner or later any writer is going to use something
that has been used. And that Christ story is one of the best stories that
man has invemcd, assuming that he did invent that story, and of course
it will reeur. Everyone that has had the story of Christ and the Passion
as part of his Christian background will in time draw from that . . . .
Of course it would be impercepcive to suggest that F aullmer is being H put
upon" by eritics without eausej I do not wish to maintain that he hasn't put
temptation in their way. Indeed, from the very beginning, as Waggoner shrewdly
points out, there is a sueeession of image, innuendo, half parallel, and overt pronouneement that ought to eonvinee the most reluctant critic of Faullmer's
" Christian" origins and intent; and in A Fable (1954) we have what appears to
be a full panoply of inventive analogue. The real question is, how ought we to
take these uses of Chriscianity. There is a genuine risk to enlightened Faulkner
critieism in the sheer weight and number of these allusions.
I should say that Faul1mer is only incidentally a critic of religion, whether
doctrinal or institutional. He is preeminently a student of man, good and evil,
symbolic and naturalistic, and of the human relationships that inform one of man's
moral inclinations. He is also, or has latcly become, a "concerncd" guardian of
the "veritics," defensive and even dcsperatcly anxious to prove that man will
" endure " and "prevail." The verities are themselves seen all but exclusively on
a human level-one might almost say, on the level of eorporeal substanee. So,
Faulkner sets hirnself again and again the simple set of alternatives: man will
progress, or he will die. All of his charaetcrs "progress" -Of try to-in accepting
the alternative to death. Their psychological complications are a result of the
human peculiarities of choice-,vhether obsessively to ehoose a kind of being,
compulsively to accept a burden of eommitment, or stoically to act against
community pressure in the interest of "the right." The right is not defined
doctrinally or lcgalistically, but in terms of human, earthy, immediate, practical
exigency. Religions symbolism does get "in the way," for after all the Bible (and
especially thc story of Christ's Passion) is a most persuasive and enduring "story"
of the hnman enigma.
I should want to put Faulkner's concerns very elose to those of Dostoevsky,
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I Except
whose Brothers Karanzazov he puts in a smal11ist of books he admiringly rereads.
that I think Dostoevsky 1S much more tensely concerned to preserve

:I Christian

doctrine, F aulkner much more inclined to regard the human tragi-

I comedy an acting out of its myth, for what specific moral values the myth has in

j'

I human appraisal. Faulkner is not only a self-stylcd "humanist"; he is interested
in every form of good and evil, relying upan mau's instinctivc discrimination COllcerning the enduringly good and the destructively evil.
1
Mr. Waggoner is not unaware of these facts, and is indeed quite admirably
I capable of taldng them iuta aCCouDt. His discussion of A Fahle is oue of the most
sensible we have. Moreover, he reviews the fiction from the beginning in an
earnest effort to determine its formal excellence and precision. But there are two
I tendencies in his review which strike me as invariably moving in a wrong direction:
he regrets many of Faulkner's choices as somchow failing to meet a standard of
which Faul1mer is himself not aware (or if he is aware, aware of it in a far
different way); he reviews Faulkner too often from a level of interpretation and
I
in a spirit of uncompromising demand that not only causes the work to fail but
also allows the critic to admire what isn't there. I had best explain by sampling
the criticism.
Soldien' Pay (the tide is annoyingly misspe11ed throughout) contains one
important image, of a "faUing cross and spire," which implies "the dominant
theme of most of Faullmer's major works, his tortured and ambiguous mixrure
of religious denial and affirmation" (p. 3). This is a11 to the good, and in many
ways a fine insight, even though its significance is large1y forccd upon the context
of an unimportant book More frequent is the tendency to take a very commonplace detail and give it an extraordinary value by relating it to a church document,
as is the case of the phrase" dust in their shoes" of Soldiers' Pay: "The image
itself comes, one suspecrs, from the Book of Common Prayer: 'Remember, 0
man, that thou art dust'" (p. 5).
Waggoner follows the Une of Christ-research in his view of The Sound (md the
Fury, in a study that is in many respects otherwise very fine inp.eed. That Benjy
might be considered a modern variant of the Christ figure is not unreasonable, if
one realizes to begin with the deliberate reductiveness of the portrait. Ir is in a
kind of patient insistencc upon the fuU ecclesiastical implication of the reference
that the critic errs. Ir is really rather obtuse to say of Benjy that "If his values
prcvailed, the family might be saved" (p. 45); and it is gratuitous, to say the
least, to caU Dilsey "a kind of foster-mother of Christ, the enabling agent of a
revelation at once spiritual and aesthetic" (p. 46). Whatever else Dilsey may be,
she is anything bur "the enabling agent of u revelation." Faullmer's own brief
statement of her and her race, that " they endured," is cnough to put her character
in the right perspective.
This free disposition of nuance is not much more shrewd thun the psychoanalytic view, offered by another critic, of Benjy as id. Ncither is wholly wrong;
both are ill-advised. i\tluch more to the point is \Naggoner's discussion of Quentin
and the tense struggle of wills with his father thut takes place at the moment of
his suicide. In fact, Waggoner's discussion of Quentin and of the Quentin" type"
in Faullmer is altogether admirable.
I find the analysis of As 1 Lay Dying quite ingcnious and altogether unacceptable.
It runs counter to almost evcrything that a careful and attentive reading of that
I
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novel should reveal. "Analysis of a worle of art is always in danger of distorting
the object it takes apart," he says (p. 76) l by way of a disclaimer. Not only
analysis but synthesis is at fault hefe. How is one to take this eloquent
affirmation?
The novel not only re-cnacts the Eucharist, it is incarnational in its very
form. In it the ward becomes flesh, meaning is embodied, idea takes on
substance and substance gets form and so meaning. (p. 87)

I can only humbly say that the novel da es no such thing, that to say this of it
is to remove it from critics' reach, and that it can be described this way only if
Addie Bundren's relationships to family and neighbors are quite deliberately distorted. This is the only piece in the boak where Waggoner gives in entirely to a
tendency (elsewhere aiways present but never altogether domineering over the
text) to replace what Faulkner says by a figurative conception of what he might or
should have said. The implications are everywhere in the interpretation: Vardaman's fish "parallels Christ killed und ritualistically eaten and drunlc to prevent
the death of the believer" (p. 66); "Worshipper, priest, altar, und the Last Supper
are a11 suggested by Vardaman's early chapters" (p. 67). Addie remains an enigma
to this critic: he seems to share Cora Tull's despair of her. Is Addie "the result
of a breaking up of the role of Christ and a distribution of the disunited functions
among several characters" (p.83)? The chapter is a remarkable example of what
ean be made of a worle of art if only one makes up one's mind firmly about it
ahead of time.
There is neither space nor need to elaborate. Waggoner's evaluations of other
novels are often very shrewd, skillfuI, intelligent. They are seldom without same
hint of earnest spiritual judgment. Not infrequendy his intelligence is waylaid
by an anxiety to visit dogmatic injunctions upon the scene and its people. His
failure to understand Joe Christmas, for exampIe, comes from his overpowering
wish to make hirn a "demonstration case": H. . . a rebuke to the community, a
measure of its sin and of its corruption of Christianity from a religion of love
and life to one of hatred and death ..." (p. 108). This is not so much umrue
as it is Htoo true." Of course Light in August is an indictment of Protestant
Christianity-among other things. It is above a11 an analysis of the violent disorder
to whieh a man comes who has been morally misled and misdirected. To say
that he Hmade no choices" (p. 116) is to miss more than half the point.
Both Pylon and Wild Pahns receive a much sounder treatment. Indeed,
Waggoner avoids the worst of the extremes of Pylon criticism, though I must
confess that his conclusion about both these novels seems very strangely sentimental: that Hin the world of Fau11mer's imagination there is finally no adequate
substitute for 'the old virtues'" (p. 147). Are we also to assurne that EHot (who
is most frequently invoked here) also preaches Hthe old virtues"? And what are
they? The rcading of Absalo11Z, Absalo11Z! is quite sound and sensible, and the
eonclusion is, I should imagine, not far off from what Faullmer might have said
of it: that in the end Shreve and Quentin examine the Sutpen story in terms of
"classieal-Chriscian tragedy ... : history contains both God's judgment and man's
decision, both necessity and freedom ..." (p. 168). The remarlcs on The Unvanquished are by a11 odds the best we have on that book.
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On the other hand, The Hamlet is crucially misunderstood. Hefe again, almost
würse tharr in earlier chapters, Waggoner's tendentiousness dominates hirn. Who
else would have thought cf Mink Snopes as a Prometheus, "unpromethean only
in his contempt for mankind " (p. 189), cr insist that Faul1mer "wholly identifies
hirnself wirh Houston," Of call Ike Snopes "little Pip, driven insane by his direct
confrontation with the reality of the depths" (p. 191)?
Thc extravagance of these associations is evcn more disturbing in the light of
Waggoner's good and often entirely perceptive rcadings cf the recent work. One
can certainly nod agreement to his assertion that in that warle Faullmer abandons
his earlier true sense of form and balance, wirh thc rcsult that there is a "splitting
apart of behavior and imagination" (p. 223), or to the fine judgment of A Fable,
that "we have constantly to readjust our understanding as passages of vivid but
not meaningful realism give way to Biblical echocs" (p. 230). Bur in this latter
case it is because the roles are for once reverscd: it is Faul1mer's cxtravagance and
Waggoner's restraint that right the balance.
I think that Waggoner is very just in this statement, and I considcr the statement
itself an excellent due to the real significance of Faul1mer's religious concerns:
It is not sirnply that Faul1mer is not Dante or .Milton or Bunyan: neithcr
is Eliot. It is rather that in Faul1mer's works the crucifixion is central
and paradigmatic, but the resurrection might never have occurrcd. (p. 247)
But one ought to ask, which crucifixion, and what is the nature of the resurrection
denied in this case. Faulkner's rnen and wornen do not die on the cross; they
invite violence, or comrnit it, and they co me dose at times to an appcarance of
wishing to push all human force to the edgc of self-destruction. Nor are they
resurrected, except in the only sense that Dilsey's Ncgro preachcr from Saint
Louis could have meant resurrection: as the persistence of man, that he will
" endure " and "prcvail." This is a wholly human circumstance, and it is attended
by great risks. But these are scraps of evidence that he has "progressed" and
that some cantankerous, error-laden sense of the good will and does win out.
It is a vulnerable position, and Faul1mer would be the last to deny its weakness.
It is a rnistake to judge it in terms of any extraneous symbology or doctrinal
system of truths-not because Faullmer is immune to criticism on any ground,
but because the merits of his work will tend to dedine and even disappcar under
so severe a scrutiny. Above a11, the best and the most scrupulous will in thc world
cannot conceal the fact that a system of extra-literary demands upon the fiction
eventually, in some way or other, distorts it. In almost every detail, thcrefore,
I should say that Mrs. OIga Viclccry's ncw book, The Novels of William Faulkner
(Louisiana State University Press), is superior to Waggoner's, and a necessary
correccive of it.
FREDERICK

University of Wisconsin

J. HOFFMAN
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Max's Nineties by Max Beerbohm, wirh an introduction by Osbert Lancaster.
New Yark: J. B. Lippincatt Campany, 1958. Pp. 10. Pl.tes. $5.00.
Thc first volume of the series of drawings planned to commemorate Max
Beerbohm's career as a caricaturist and cartoonist has made its debut in England
and America after a delay occasioned by the death of its editor Allan Wade.
The idea of celebrating each decade of Max's work as a graphie artist with a
volume of his best uncollected, unpublished, cr otherwise hard to obtain drawings
had been Wade's, and the artist hirnself had lang aga gladly placed his imprimatur
upon the scheme. But Beerbohm's intention to write for each plate in the series
"a brief critical note about ehe drawing cr the person" was cut short by his
own death in 1956-although not before he was able to seleet the sketches he
himself felt best epitomized his work in the 'nineties.
One obvious advantage in having Beerbohm's own ehoiee of drawings for
the volume is that his seleetion was guided as mueh by a nostalgia for his subjects
as by a sensitivity to the artistry with which he had sketched them. The result
is that he has given us a good cross-section of the kinds of people who had most
enthralled his interests, tastes, and imagination in the {in de siecle atmosphere
he recorded, often satirically, in essay as weH as in drawing. One is not surprised
to find the book most heavily populated by such literary aequaintanees as Oscar
Wilde, George Moore, George Meredith, Henry James, and W. B. Yeatsj the
politieal figures who intrigued hirn ever sirrce he had been "a small boy seeing
giants "j and the theatrical performers whom he had probably met through his
actor brother Beerbohm Tree or encountered "professionaHy" after he sueeeeded Shaw as dramatic eritic on the Saturday Review. Ey induding two rather
dandified self-earicatures-one for the frontispiece of the volume and another
(a rear vicw) for the tailpiece-l\Ilax ingeniously accomplishes his own entrance
and exit with characteristic elegance and nonchalance.
The task of completing Allan Wade's editorial work on the collection fell
to Mr. Osbert Lancaster, a humorist who, like Beerbohm, has shown himself to
be as articulate and witty with the draftsman's pen as with the writer's. However,
perhaps becausc MI. Lancaster's own work is really so divergent in method and
irrtent from Beerbohm's, he reveals in his introduction to the collcction a misapprehension of the fuIl value of this sampie of Beerbohm's early drawings.
To Mr. Lancastcr, one of the paramount accomplishments of Max's Nineties
is that it demonstrates Beerbohm's earIy wisdom in disassociating himself from the
all but exhausted du Maurier-Leech-Keene tradition of using the satirical cartoon
as a lampoon of the upper dass domestic scene. Rather .MI. Lancaster sees
Beerbohm, and rightly so, as a revivalist of the tradition of the single-figure
caricatural portrait, wruch was onee so fresh and vital in the work of Vanity
Fair's "Ape" (CarIo Pellegrini). As far as the artistic merits of the drawings
themselves are concerned, however, Mr. Lancaster finds thcir chief interest to
He in the embryonie way they prefigure the maturity of craftsmanship to follow
and reflect the "false starts and responsive influences from withom" to be
abandoned later.
It is in this latter vein of reasoning that Mr. Lancaster goes astray-or rather
does not go far enough. What he fails to see, in his haste to attribute Beerbohm's
multifarious caricatural styles to tentative borrowings and "false starts," is that

BOOK REVIEWS

403

Max ehe sketch artist was just as much ehe virtuoso of parody as Beerbohm ehe
writer of A Christ17l4S Garland. He sees Max's isolated eifort co c3ricature Phil
May in May's Qwn style of drawing for Punch as a revelation Co Max himself
that May's swift, heavy, but very economical line was tao purely visual co be
made compatible wich his own conceptual approach. Bue Bccrbohm's efTort hefe
was obviously not Co adapt a style of drawing Co his own uses but merely co
caricature a renowned artist and at ehe same time Co revel in aperfeet parady
of that artist's ccchnique, just as his drawing of Beardsley pulling a toy FIeneh
poodle is concomitantly a caricature of Beardsley's person, a mockery of his
francophilism, and a parady of his style of draftsmanship.
Such drastic deviations in execucion, ,vithom any attempt to fuse or extend
the various techniques, is strong evidence that Max, even in this early period,
was merely parodying styles rather than groping for one of his own. The clever
parodist-the one who 1S able to simulate with only mild exaggeracion and without
burlesque the most characteriscic spirit and form of the original-usually achieves
this power to fathom others so completely only after he matures and perfects
his own tcchnique. Indeed, Bohun Lynch's discovery almost fony years ago
of rudiments of the "Beerbohmian" style in such of Max's juvenilia as his selfcaricatures drawn when he was fifteen (1887) and his sketches done at Oxford
(1895), directly, though of course anachronistically, challenges Mr. Lancaster's
conclusions. Certainly, among Max's drawings in the present colleccion, the
carieature of, let us say, Earl Spencer (1895), wirh its sense of sclf-possessioo and
graeeful movement, is just as "Beerbohmian " as anything Beerbohm did later.
Whereas some of Beerbohm's drawings in the 'ninecies were, as I have pointed
out, just as parodie as his early gcms of prose and verse in A Cbristmas Garland,
many of his essays were just as caricatural as his drawings. Both are really
species of the same art with the same mode and intent-ooly the medium of
expression is different. One can see in this present scleccion that the drawing
of Sir William Hareourt as a robuscious mulci-chinned and very solid righttriangle of a man delivering a speech in Parliament is in exaet tonal aecord with
Beerbohm's deseripcion of hirn, in his essay on the "House of Commons .Manner,"
as a speaker who, "majestic among molehills," pours out the "last poor rivulets
of the old lava" of a florid rhetorical style. Or one can see how Max's profile
sketch of George Moore, with its soft glowing white head undcmarcated from
its gray background and with a vague question-mark for the eye and cheek,
later evolves into his word caricature of Moore as a person of "luminous vagueness" with an "oudine [tlut] seemed to merge into the air around hirn."
Besides paralleling both the descripcive and interpretive treatment of personality
in the writings, the drawings in j\;[ax's Nineties, like the drawings that were done
hter, complement the essays by offering a furthcr insight into thc kind of polideal
and aesthetic sensibility with which Beerbohm rcsponded to the whole fin de
siEcle decade. The cnthusiasm with which he wrote on "Dandies and Dandyism"
is given its full scope of expression in the loving care with which he drew the
elegant poses and clothes of such dandies as Wilde, Beardsley, Earl Spencer,
Cunoinghame Graham, and of course his own urbane self. And the top hat,
which he wrote nostalgically aboDt io 1942 as "a black but shining old monument"
of the past, is here, evcn in one of the early sketches of "club types," given the
bright highlights with whieh he continued to be fascinated in his later drawings
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and which, together with the slender elegantly shod foot, became the typical
Beerbohm symbol for the Victorian and Edwardian dandy.
Although Max's political figures in this series appear chiefly in caricatures rather
than in cartoons and therefore carry no obvious political thesis, the exceptional
cartoon sequence in wruch "Mr. Gladstone Goes to Heaven," but ultimately
ends up in the ather place, could hardly luve delighted serious-minded Gladstonians. Onee again the drawings can be seen to form a harrnony with the
writings, for in U A Small Boy Seeing Giants" Beerbohm tells us that although
he staod in awe of Gladstone the grand old statesman, his Conservative palities
inherited from his father forced hirn to regard the aged prime minister as "a
great power for evil." We can see why this frame of mind consequently forced
him to reject Punch's presentation of Gladstone as "muscular" and in "striking"
attitudes. In fact, Beerbohm's picture of hirn is rather that of a mean and vulgar
person: his actions are cowardly and obsequious, his face is that of an irascible
Scrooge, and his misshapen top hat and enormous feet make hirn the epitome
of the "anti-dandy."
From a11 this it ean be seen that in Max's Nineties the caricatures and cartoons
are as eonceptual as they are perceptual in rendering the essential aspeets of the
personalities of the figures represented.
Mueh could be said about the tradition-aside from the already mentianed
parodie one-to which Beerbahm's wark in this volurne belongs. That lVlax was
not a subscriber to the papular notion that a caricature necessarily had to assume
the proportions of a small body and a large head is amply demonstrated by the
almost miniscular heads he places upon the torsos of Arthur Balfour and Sir
William Hareourr. That he somctimes reverted to the original seventeenth
century Italian cancept of the "caricatura" as a man drawn in the likeness of
an animal can be seen, I think, in the barely suggcsted walrus-li1ce head and face
he gives to Sir George Lewis and the more obvious rooster-like appearance of
Joseph Chamberlain (who obligingly holds out his coat tails to suggest, to my
mind at least, a fo\vl's wing and tai! plume).
One comment should be made in antieipation of an objection to the draftsman~
ship of some of the drawings. The point i5 weIl taken by Mr. Lancaster that
since in the 'nineties block-maldng by photographie reproduction on zine was
still in its infancy, the mandatory use of the line-block method wirh its reHance
on the pen rather than on the pencil makes some of Max's drawings in this
volume appear to unfair disadvantage when compared to same of bis reprodueed
peneil work. With this point in mind as the only real, and unavoidable, flaw
in a volume of drawings whieh have value as both art and document for an
interesting decade and which form a witty and varied companion to the writings
of one of our most accomplished essayists, the peruser of Max's Nineties should
discover that he has in his hands a small treasure-house of constant delight.

Roy Huss
University of Messina
Sicily
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Interpretations of Americcm Literature, according co its editors, Charles Feidelson
and Paul Brodtlcorb, "is designed co serve the student and ehe inquiring reader
as a running commentary on ehe basic texts" of American licerature. Beyand chis
the editors tread very cautiously. The articles neither represent "any particu:lar
mode of interpretation" nor "ehe fuIl range of methods and preoccupations in
contemporary discussion of American writcrs." Thc essays are co help ehe student
"grasp particular literary facts-works or writers or movements . . . by posing
questiollS of sufficient scope and offering answers adequate to the questions
asked."
The book, however, has more coherence and significance than the modest assertions of its editors indicate. The opening essay is on Tbe Scarlet Letter and the
editorial assumption that the basic texts of American literature begin here is in
keeping with the nature of the entire anthology. This book is a coIlection of
criticism about literature first-even about particular literary worles first-and about
movements and writers only secondarily. It nods only shyly and occasionally in
the direction of the history of American literature, or the history of American
ideas, or the history of American writers. To exelude such writers as Franldin.
Irving, and Cooper without even an apologetic gesture is perhaps a linIe literarily
snobbish, but no one can seriously propose that any worle in American literature
prior to Tbe Scarlet Letter is even elose to the latter in literary eminence. And
since major literary work by Poe, Melville, Emerson, Whitman, and Thoreau is
being done almost simultaneously one might weIl say that it is at this point in
our cultural development that American writing achieved sufficient literary
dignity to be identified as American literature.
The essays in this anthology are as often as possible interpretative essays as the
title indicates. Consequently the reader's attention is concentrated as exclusively
as is practical on the texts of American literature. Yet the best essays in the
anthology are those which in the process of explicating the particular wode or
works demonstrate at the same time a sensitive awareness of the personality of the
author as well as an initimate Imowledge oE the particular milieu in which, and
perhaps partially because of which, the work was created.
Two essays will indicate the point. Calvin S. Brown's "The Musical Development of Symbols: Whitman" is one of the weakest selections in this book because
of its carefully limited purpose. Mr. Brov,rn's essay is an extract from his book
Music and Literature where it serves as an effective part of his total argument.
Here it is tao exclusively esthetic; that Whitman utilizes musical principles in
developing his symbols does not say enough about Whitman or his place in
American literature to serve the purpose of this anthology.
On the other hand Dorothea Krook's "Principles and Method in the Later
Wodes of Henry James" is one oE the most fitting and significant selections. It is
an analysis of the significance of the "abtractness" of J ames's late style. Miss
Krook explains the style in terms of the ambitions and tenets stated in James's
critical prefaces. She explains it in terms of the sins of pride, ennui, "cankerous
sexuality," and "infernal aestheticism" which are peculiarly Jamesian preoccupations in the late novels. There is abrief discussion of James's boyhood, his
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reading, and the manner in which his milieu influenced his particular way of
perceiving and hence of writing. The analysis of James's abstract style thus
becomes a cornucopia from which critical information flows in plenty. Miss Krook
starts with a particular problem and never loses sight of it, but on the way to
solving it she exposes the reader to a weIter of literary facts and insights concerning the late novels of James.
In most instances the editors have chosen essays that are more than simpIy interprctations of particular works. Oftcn these essays open up into generalizations
about the writer's total work and the period he writes in so as to form something
of a continuously challenging commentary on the nature of American literature
itself. On the other hand occasionally, as in the instance of MI. Brown's essay,
the editors seem to have been content with an interpretation which, though
sufficient to its own purpose, is comparatively weak bccause of the very modesty
of its intention.
There are two essays different in nature frorn the rest: Lionel Trilling's
"Reality in America" and Roy Harvey Pearce's "The Poet as Person." Each
essay uses the work of nvo or more writers to speculate about a cultural condition.
Mr. Trilling attacks an assumption about the nature of reality which he finds
fostered by the criticism of Vernon Parrington and which leads to an uncritical
preference for writers represented by Dreiser as opposed to writers representcd
by James. Mr. Pearce uses an argument benveen William Carlos Williams and
Ezra Pound, exposed in their letters, to illustrate a split among contemporary
poets between those who find the possibility of significant community within
their own individuated sensibilities, illustrated primarily by Willia~s, Stevens,
and Cummings, and those who find the possibility of significant community only
outside the self, illustrated primarily by Pound, EHot, and Frost.
Both essays are challenging and responsible attempts to explain difficult problems
and need no apology for inclusion in this anthology. But each essay appears in
the anthology in a position where one might expect more. \Vith the exception
of MI. Trilling's essay the editors chose to move direcdy from Twain to James
to Hemingway. One might justify excluding Howells, Norris, and Crane, but
it is regrettable that there is no discussion of Henry Adams, particularly in view
of the increasing ioterest in his works in the past few years. Mr. Pearce's essay
is thc only essay on modern American poetry and suggests that poetry gets short
shrift compared to fiction. While there are !Wo essays each 00 Hemingway and
Faulknerj Pound, Eliot, Stevens, Frost, Cummings, Williams, and others are given
necessarily only the briefest discussion in MI. Pearce's essay.
Interpretations of American Literature suffers from the editors' apparent unwillingness to formulate a very specific principle of selection for its essays. The
arrangement of the essays and many of the essays themselves suggest that the
editors' principles of selection were ofren more complex rhan their modest admissions. Yet such problems of coherence do not keep the anthology frorn being
a collection of significant statements about American literarurc.
ROBERT

University of Kansas City
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